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Blakeslee: Due Process

DUE PROCESS
U.S. CONST.

amend. V.

No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ....
U.S.CONST amend. XIV, § 1:
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinentpart that
no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdictionthe equalprotection of the laws.
N.Y. CONSIT art. I, § 6:
This section provides in pertinent part that "[n]o person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law."
COURT OF APPEALS
People v. David W.'
(Decided June 15, 2000)
Defendant, who was convicted of a sex offense in the New
York State Supreme Court in 1995, appeals from a conviction for
failing to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender
Registration Act (hereinafter "SORA"). 2
SORA took effect
during the defendant's five-year probation term following two
consecutive jail sentences for charges of sodomy and sexual abuse
of two underage victims.3 Defendant moved to dismiss the suit in
New York Supreme Court alleging that SORA violated the ex post
facto, 4 equal protection5 and due process guarantees of the
95 N.Y.2d 130, 733 N.E.2d 206, 711 N.Y.S.2d 134 (2000).
N.Y. C.L.R. § 168 et seq. (1999).
3 David W., 95 N.Y.2d at 135, 733 N.E.2d at 206, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 138.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 9 cl. 3 provides in pertinent part that "[n]o Bill of
Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed." Id.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
2
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Fourteenth Amendment 6 of the United States Constitution and
Article One Section Six 7 of the New York Constitution. 8
Defendant's challenges were rejected by the Supreme Court, and
he was sentenced to one-year imprisonment. 9 The Appellate
Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision rejecting
defendant's ex post facto and equal protection claims. 10 In
addition, the defendant's due process claim was also denied as a
result of the court's belief that SORA provided ample safeguards
against a wrongful deprivation of defendant's interests." The New
York Court of Appeals granted defendant's motion to appeal to
determine whether defendant, after being convicted of a sex
offense, is entitled to a constitutional right to notice and an
opportunity to be heard before being classified as "a sexually
violent predator" under SORA.12
In May 1995, defendant plead guilty to charges of sodomy
and sexual abuse with two underage victims and served concurrent
jail sentences followed by a five-year probation term. 13 SORA
took effect prior to the termination of his five-year probation and
imposed a duty on the defendant to register as a sex offender in a
sexually violent predator subdirectory, which is distributed to
interested communities. 14 The defendant was notified of his
obligation to register, however, he was classified as a level three
offender, or a "sexually violent predator," representing the highest
risk assignable under SORA without an opportunity to be heard
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." Id.
6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

7 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part that "[n]o
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."

Id.
8 David W., 95 N.Y.2d at 135, 733 N.E.2d at 206, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
9 Id. at 136, 733 N.E.2d at 210, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 138.
10 Id.

n Id. The court based this finding on SORA's provision that allowed the
defendant to seek relief from the court from the further duty to register and the
ability to bring an Article 78 proceeding to review the Division of Probation and
Correctional Alternatives determination. Id.
12 Id. at 134, 733 N.E.2d at 209, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 136 (quoting N.Y. C.L.S.
§ 168-16(c) (1999)).
13 David W., 95 N.Y.2d at 135, 733 N.E.2d at 206, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
14 Id.
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prior to the determination of his risk level.' 5 A probation
employee was responsible for making the initial classification
determination assigned to the defendant.' 6 Such a classification
description and exact address to
allows defendant's photograph,
17
appear in the directory.
The Court of Appeals focused on the fundamental principle
inherent in the due process guarantees of both the United States
and New York Constitutions, such that "when the State seeks to
take life, liberty, or property from an individual, the State must
provide effective procedures that guard against an erroneous
deprivation., 18 Procedural due.process, within the meaning of the
Fifth' 9 and Fourteenth Amendments, 20 confines governmental
action, which imposes a deprivation upon an individual, through a
prior hearing.21

15 Id.
16

Id. at 134, 733 N.E.2d at 209, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 136. In the instant case, the

defendant's risk level was determined by an employee who received one day of
training with respect to the methods and guidelines set forth by the Board of
Examiners of Sex Offenders to assist the individual in determining risk level.
The determination is made on the based on four primary risk factors: current
offenses; criminal history; post-offense behavior and release environment. The
assessment is based on a point system whereby points are assigned with respect
to the defendant's conduct and character as a result of a detailed analysis of the
four factors.
The defendant was assigned points sufficient to categorize him at the highest
risk under SORA. The defendant was then offered and seized the opportunity to
challenge and review the SORA level assigned to him whereby disputing and
objecting to various points he received. The Department of Probation and
Correctional Alternatives failed to address any of defendant's objections, but
instead stated that the level three determination was correct. Id.
17 Id.
'" David W., 95 N.Y.2d at 136, 733 N.E.2d at 210, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 138. See
also U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 9 cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
19 U.S. CONST. amend. V. This section provides in pertinent part that "[n]o
person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
20
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." Id.
21 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
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In Mathews v. Eldridge,2 the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged the elasticity of due process in an effort determine
what type of evidentiary hearing is required prior to the
termination of disability benefits.2 3 The Court established that
24
confines of due process are not technical and clear cut.
Furthermore, for guidance in determining whether administrative
procedures provided prior to the termination of an individual's
22

Id. In Mathews, the issue before the Court was whether the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment entitled the respondent to an evidentiary hearing
prior to the termination of his Social Security disability benefits. Under Title II
of the Social Security Act benefits are provided to workers when they have
demonstrated that they are unable to participate in any substantial employment
as a result of any physical or mental impairments. Eldridge was awarded
benefits in 1968. In 1972, the state agency responsible with monitoring his
condition reviewed his file, and informed Eldridge that it had made a tentative
determination that his disability has ceased in May 1972. Eldridge disputed the
findings by the agency in a written response. However, the state agency made
its final determination reaffirming its tentative decision. The Social Security
Administration accepted the agency's determination and notified Eldridge that
his benefits would terminate immediately. Eldridge was informed of his right to
have the state agency reconsider his condition within six months. Instead
Eldridge brought an action challenging the constitutionality of the procedures
for terminating disability benefits and sought reinstatement of benefits until a
hearing was granted.
The United States Supreme Court reversed holding that the present
administrative procedures are consistent with due process and that an
evidentiary hearing is not required prior to terminating of disability benefits.
The Court based its decision on the flexibility of due process because each
situation in itself presents different threats to the individual, and thus the need
for procedural protections depending on that given set of facts. The Court
developed a three part test to apply to situation where procedural safeguards
should be present to safeguard one's due process rights, i.e. not having life,
liberty, or property taken away with out a hearing. Id.
23 Mathews, at 334.
24 Id. See Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (The Court
was silent concerning the Constitutional right of an individual- to a
pretermination hearing involving garnishment of wages). See also Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (for an individual's driver's license to be revoked
due process required that a hearing prior to revocation reveal the existence of
probable cause as to the fault of the licensee and did not have to address the
question of liability). But see, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (the only
case where the Court has held that a hearing closely resembling a judicial trial is
required prior to the deprivation of some type of property interest even if such a
hearing will follow). Id.
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disability benefits are consistent with the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth 25 and Fourteenth 26 Amendments, the Court concentrated
on three factors and analyzed the governmental and private
interests.27
The first factor considered by the Court was the strength
private interest that will be affected by the official action. 28 The
second factor the Court looked to was the risk of erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards. 29 Lastly, the above two factors are considered in light
of the interest held by the government such as the administrative
and fiscal burdens that an additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.3°
In applying the above mentioned three-part test to
determine the value of an evidentiary hearing prior to the
termination of an individual's disability benefits, the Mathews
Court looked to its previous holding in Goldberg v. Kelly3' to
determine whether these two cases resulted in a interpretiational
ambiguity, or whether the two cases presented different factual
situations which justified different holdings. 32 In Goldberg, the
adversely affected party was estopped from collecting welfare
benefits without a procedural hearing. 33 The Goldberg Court held
25 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
26 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

27 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); See also Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972) "[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands").
Id.
29 Id. The focus of the Court centered on two key inquiries with respect to the
second prong. Their first consideration was the complexity of the issues
involved, meaning that when the governmental action is contingent upon factual
questions, the greater there is going to be a need for process to protect the
private interest. Conversely, the more objective the information, the less formal
the procedure. Second, the Court tries to protect against erroneous decisions
leading to deprivation of liberty or property by taking into account the
government's rate of errors. The greater the number of errors the greater the
grocess the court may impose to minimize such errors. Id.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
31

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).

32 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
33 See Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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that an evidentiary hearing must be provided prior to an
individual's welfare benefits being terminated.34 On the other
hand, the Mathews Court noted that the private interest that will be
adversely affected by an erroneous termination of benefits to a
disabled worker is generally less, compared to a welfare recipient,
because disability benefits are not based on financial need.
Further, the Mathews Court found a greater governmental interest
and held that an evidentiary type hearing was not necessary prior
to termination of social security
disability benefits in order to
36
satisfy procedural due process.
The David W. Court, in support of its decision, looked to
the decision in Matter of Lee TT v. Dowling,37 in which it
recognized that an individual's liberty interest is substantial where
one's name or reputation within a community is questioned or a
legal right modified.38 Moreover, the Court looked to its own
decision in Matter of Swinton v. Safir,39 in which the Court found
that the likelihood that allegations of rape and abuse contained in
the personal file of a fired public employee having the potential to
be distributed to other employees possessed the requisite
impairment to that employee's liberty interest to justify due
process protections.4 °
In applying Matter of Lee TT and Matter of Swinton to the
instant case, the Court found that a risk level three determination,
34 Id. at 325 (citing Goldberg,397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
35 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (recognizing the applicability of procedural due

process guarantees with respect to termination of Social Security disability
benefits such that the receipt of benefits is a property interest protected by the
Fifth Amendment)

Id. The procedures that the government has in place, specifically the
individual may submit written explanations prior to termination and a full
evidentiary hearing after termination. Id.
36

37 87 N.Y.2d 699, 664 N.E.2d 1243, 642 N.Y.S. 181 (1996) (holding that the

due process clause of the Federal Constitution requires that, in order -for the
Department of Social Services to place petitioner's name in the New York State
Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment following a hearing, a fact
finder must determine that the justification for placing the individual's name in
the report be substantiated by a fair preponderance of the evidence prior to
sending the information to employers in the child care industry).
" Id. at 708, 664 N.E.2d at 1250, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
'993 N.Y.2d 758, 720 N.E.2d 89, 697 N.Y.S.2d 869 (1999).
40 David W., 95 N.Y.2d at 137, 138, 733 N.E.2d at 210, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 138.
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published in a sexually violent predator subdirectory, possessed a
considerably greater effect on defendant's liberty interest, thus
stimulating due process protections. 41 The Court held that the
State's procedures did not sufficiently mitigate the risk of an
inaccurate finding that a sex offender on probation is a sexually
violent predator. 4 In doing so, the Court found that the defendant
has a profound private interest in not being stigmatized as a
sexually violent piredator.43 The Court further noted that being
labeled a sexually violent predator under SORA had a much
greater impact on the defendant's life, because the label is a
"determination of status" which may have a detrimental effect on
the accused's life, specifically with community interaction. 44 The
resulting effect on the defendant's life was deemed to have
threatened the defendant's liberty by ignoring his right to due
process.
In respect to the second prong of the Mathews test, the
Court found that the procedures used to determine the defendant's
risk level were not sufficient in respect to preventing "the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of defendant's interest., 46 The defendant
was not presented with an opportunity to challenge his risk level
determination.47
The evaluation of the third prong involved the court's
discernment whether the Legislature, in trying to consolidate
procedures and facilitate the determination of SORA risk levels for
Id.
David W., 95 N.Y.2d at 137, 733 N.E.2d at 211, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 139.
43 Id.
44 Id. (considering the significant effect that a level three classification may
have on prospective employer's willingness to hire an individual that has such a
record).
41 Id. at 138, 733 N.E.2d at 211, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 139.
46 Id. (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 319 which noted that
"[t]he bedrock of
due process is notice and opportunity to be heard").
47 Id. The defendant was not notified that a determination under SORA was
being made, he was not advised of the information relied upon in making such
determination, nor was he afforded an opportunity to object to the State's
characterization of his behavior prior to the making the determination.
However, the court noted that sex offender who are still in custody when the
sentencing court make the risk level determination, the court is required to allow
the offender to appear and be heard, consider his statements, and inform him of
his right to counsel. Id.
41
42
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individuals already on probation, have instead collided with
constitutional due process impediments. 48
The fiscal and
administrative burdens imposed on the State, by requiring notice
and an opportunity to be heard prior to a SORA risk level
determination is made upon an individual, are not so problematic
nor significant to justify
limiting the individual to proscribed
49
legislative procedures.
Accordingly, the Court determined that the SORA
Correction Law 5° does not properly guard against subjecting an
individual to an erroneous risk level classification. 51 The law fails
to provide the means for examining whether the individual's
circumstances were analyzed properly to arrive at his risk level.52
The Court of Appeals explained that the due process clause
requires that the State bear the burden of proving that a defendant
deserves the classification he is assigned. 53 Since the State failed
to do so, the risk level determination made in respect to the
defendant did not conform with minimum State or Federal
constitutional requirements of due process.
Courtney Blakeslee

48 David W., 95 N.Y.2d at 139, 733 N.E.2d at 212, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
49 id.

50

N.Y. C.L.R. § 168 et seq. (1999).

"' David W., 95 N.Y.2d at 140, 733 N.E.2d at 213, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
52 id.
53 id.
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